অদ্বৈতসিদ্ধিসম্মত মিথ্যাত্বের প্রথমলক্ষণ: একটি বিশ্লেষণমূলক সমীক্ষা
Volume-XIII, Issue-IV, July 2025
Volume-XIII, Issue-IV, July 2025 | ||
Received: 30.06.2025 | Accepted: 18.07.2025 | |||
Published Online: 31.07.2025 | Page No: 30-42 | |||
DOI: 10.64031/pratidhwanitheecho.vol.13.issue.04W.005 | ||||
অদ্বৈতসিদ্ধিসম্মত মিথ্যাত্বের প্রথমলক্ষণ: একটি বিশ্লেষণমূলক সমীক্ষা বিদ্যুৎ মণ্ডল, সহকারী অধ্যাপক, দর্শন বিভাগ, প্রেসিডেন্সি বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়, কলকাতা, পশ্চিমবঙ্গ, ভারত | |
The First Definition of Falsity According to Advaita Siddhi: An Analytical Study Bidyut Mondal, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Presidency University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India | |
This paper undertakes a critical investigation into the Advaita Vedānta understanding of the relationship between reality and illusion, foregrounding the central metaphysical claim that Brahman—the non-dual, unconditioned absolute—is the only ontological truth. Within this framework, the phenomenal world, though pragmatically experienced, is ultimately deemed mithyā—neither absolutely real nor entirely unreal, but false in relation to the unqualified reality of Brahman. The doctrine of mithyātva thus emerges as a conceptual linchpin in Advaita's non-dual ontology, necessitating rigorous philosophical articulation to safeguard the coherence of advaita (non-duality). In pursuit of this, the paper engages with the sophisticated exegetical tradition preserved in Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Advaitasiddhi, where five historically significant definitions of mithyātva are meticulously catalogued. Intriguingly, none of these definitions originate with Madhusūdana himself, attesting to the rich dialogical texture of Advaitic thought. The definitions discussed trace their provenance to Pañcapādikākāra, Vivaraṇakāra (two definitions), Citsukhācārya, and Ānandabodhācārya—the latter being the author of Makaranda. This paper centers on the first and perhaps most foundational of these definitions: sadasattvānadhikaraṇatvaṃ mithyātvam—falsity as that which is not the locus of either existence or non-existence. Through a close textual and philosophical analysis of this formulation, the paper aims to illuminate its epistemological and ontological ramifications, situating it within broader Advaitic concerns regarding perception, cognition, and the limits of discursive knowledge. In doing so, the study contributes to an enriched understanding of Advaita Vedānta’s metaphysical rigor and the subtlety with which it negotiates the paradoxes of appearance and reality. | |
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