নিষেধাত্মক সাত্ত্বিক বচন: ভাষার একটি দার্শনিক বিশ্লেষণ
Volume-XI, Issue-I, October 2022
Volume-XI, Issue-I, October 2022 | ||
Published Online: 31.10.2022 | Page No: 90-96 | |||
নিষেধাত্মক সাত্ত্বিক বচন: ভাষার একটি দার্শনিক বিশ্লেষণ প্রণব ঘোষ, সহকারী অধ্যাপক, দর্শন বিভাগ, যতীন্দ্র রাজেন্দ্র মহাবিদ্যালয়, পশ্চিমবঙ্গ, ভারত | |
“Prohibitory Sattvic Propositions: A Philosophical Analysis of Language” Pranab Ghosh, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Jatindra Rajendra College, West Bengal, India | |
Classical logic is based upon the existential presupposition that all singular terms have denotation, i.e., they are non-empty. When we assert the existence of something by sentences of the form like, ‘Rabindranath exists’, ‘The present king of India exists’, we have singular existential statements. Sometimes we also assert such sentences viz, ‘The present king of India does not exist’, ‘Unicorn does not exist’, ‘and the round-square does not exist’. The former are called affirmative existential statement, whereas later are called negative existential statement. Such negative existential statements as, ‘Pegasus does not exist’, ‘Unicorn does not exist’, have been a constant problem to the classical logician. In the subject predicate form of sentences such as, ‘Rabindranath is wise’, “Goose is white’, we certainly think that, the sentence ‘Rabindranath is wise’ is about Rabindranath and the sentence ‘Goose is white’ is about Goose. Grammatical similarities with such subject predicate form of sentences might induce us to think that negative existential statement like as; ‘Pegasus does not exist’ is about Pegasus. But the problem is: how can we say that ‘Pegasus does not exist’ – is about Pegasus? When there is no Pegasus. Do they exist at all? Do they exist in the same sense in which physical objects are said to exist? | |
Keywords: Logic, Existence, Empty Terms, Singular Terms, Denotation, Statement |