অদ্বৈতসিদ্ধিসম্মত মিথ্যাত্বের প্রথমলক্ষণ: একটি বিশ্লেষণমূলক সমীক্ষা
Volume-XIII, Issue-III, April 2025 > Volume-XIII, Issue-IV, July 2025
Volume-XIII, Issue-IV, July 2025 |
Received: 30.06.2025 | Accepted: 18.07.2025 | ||||
Published Online: 31.07.2025 | Page No: 30-42 | ||||
DOI: 10.64031/pratidhwanitheecho.vol.13.issue.04W.005 | |||||
অদ্বৈতসিদ্ধিসম্মত মিথ্যাত্বের প্রথমলক্ষণ: একটি বিশ্লেষণমূলক
সমীক্ষা বিদ্যুৎ মণ্ডল, সহকারী অধ্যাপক, দর্শন বিভাগ, প্রেসিডেন্সি বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়, কলকাতা,
পশ্চিমবঙ্গ, ভারত |
The First
Definition of Falsity According to Advaita Siddhi: An Analytical Study Bidyut Mondal, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Presidency University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India | ||
ABSTRACT | ||
This paper undertakes a critical investigation
into the Advaita Vedānta understanding of the relationship between
reality and illusion, foregrounding the central metaphysical claim that Brahman—the non-dual, unconditioned absolute—is the only
ontological truth. Within this framework, the phenomenal world, though
pragmatically experienced, is ultimately deemed mithyā—neither absolutely real nor entirely unreal, but
false in relation to the unqualified reality of Brahman. The doctrine of mithyātva thus emerges as a
conceptual linchpin in Advaita's non-dual ontology, necessitating rigorous
philosophical articulation to safeguard the coherence of advaita (non-duality).
In pursuit of this, the paper engages with the
sophisticated exegetical tradition preserved in Madhusūdana
Sarasvatī’s Advaitasiddhi, where five historically significant definitions of mithyātva are meticulously catalogued. Intriguingly, none
of these definitions originate with Madhusūdana himself, attesting to
the rich dialogical texture of Advaitic thought. The definitions discussed
trace their provenance to Pañcapādikākāra,
Vivaraṇakāra (two
definitions), Citsukhācārya, and Ānandabodhācārya—the
latter being the author of Makaranda. This paper
centers on the first and perhaps most foundational of these definitions: sadasattvānadhikaraṇatvaṃ mithyātvam—falsity as that which is not the locus of either
existence or non-existence.
Through a close textual and philosophical analysis
of this formulation, the paper aims to illuminate its epistemological and
ontological ramifications, situating it within broader Advaitic concerns
regarding perception, cognition, and the limits of discursive knowledge. In
doing so, the study contributes to an enriched understanding of Advaita Vedānta’s
metaphysical rigor and the subtlety with which it negotiates the paradoxes of
appearance and reality. | ||
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